Rethinking Defence Doctrine After Wars

Contemporary wars are driving a profound transformation in strategic thinking‭, ‬as defence doctrine is no longer viewed merely as‭ ‬a military and technical framework for organising the use of force‭. ‬Instead‭, ‬it has evolved into a comprehensive system reflecting how states interact with an increasingly complex security environment shaped by multiple sources of threat and the growing overlap between military‭, ‬economic‭, ‬and technological dimensions in a world marked by volatility and instability‭.‬

Recent conflicts reveal not only temporary shifts in military dynamics‭, ‬but also structural weaknesses within traditional defence models‭. ‬This reality has intensified calls to rethink defence doctrine in the post-war era through more comprehensive and flexible approaches capable of adapting to evolving conflict dynamics and managing uncertainty within the strategic environment‭.‬

Against this backdrop‭, ‬the development of defence doctrine is no longer a theoretical option but a strategic necessity imposed by the nature of modern threats‭. ‬Defence has evolved beyond the traditional concepts of protection and deterrence‭, ‬but increasingly relies on a combination of resilience‭, ‬integration‭, ‬and sustainability‭. ‬In an era characterised by rising asymmetric threats‭ ‬and the growing importance of economic and technological power‭, ‬the strongest state is no longer simply the one with the largest‭ ‬military arsenal‭, ‬but the one capable of redefining defence as a comprehensive system integrating military power‭, ‬societal resilience‭, ‬and economic endurance‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬the future of defence doctrines is moving towards a multidimensional model that reshapes the balance of power in the post-war world‭. ‬The objective is no longer limited to preventing war‭, ‬but also includes managing conflict when it occurs‭, ‬containing its consequences‭, ‬and ensuring national continuity despite prolonged crises‭.‬

In this context‭, ‬the experience of North Atlantic Treaty Organization following the Russia–Ukraine war provides a significant example of how major crises compel states and alliances to reassess defence priorities and redefine concepts such as deterrence‭, ‬readiness‭, ‬and strategic autonomy‭. ‬The Ukrainian conflict pushed the alliance back towards its core mission of collective defence after years focused on external operations‭, ‬particularly in Afghanistan‭. ‬The Newport Summit also represented a turning point‭, ‬reinforcing collective defence‭, ‬interoperability‭, ‬and increased European defence spending as‭ ‬central strategic priorities‭.‬

Similarly‭, ‬recent conflicts‭, ‬including regional confrontations involving Iran‭, ‬Israel‭, ‬and the United State demonstrate that contemporary wars are no longer confined to traditional military confrontations‭. ‬Instead‭, ‬they have become testing grounds for redefining deterrence‭, ‬readiness‭, ‬resilience‭, ‬and the integration of military and non-military instruments within an increasingly interconnected and complex strategic landscape‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬this study seeks to analyse these transformations by examining the key strategic lessons reshaping defence doctrines among states affected by modern wars‭. ‬It aims to establish a broader understanding of defence as a multidimensional system capable of adapting to a strategic environment defined by complexity and uncertainty‭.‬

Strategic Lessons Reshaping Defence Doctrine After Contemporary Wars

1‭. ‬The Collapse of the Assumption of Shared Rationality‭:‬‭ ‬Contemporary wars have exposed the limits of the assumption of shared rationality in international relations‭. ‬The behaviour of international actors is no longer governed by a mutually accepted rational logic or stable and predictable rules‭, ‬but increasingly shaped by power calculations and strategic interests‭. ‬Recent crises‭, ‬including Iranian attacks targeting Gulf states despite efforts to avoid escalation and prevent direct war‭, ‬demonstrated that international actors do not always act according to what others perceive as‭ ‬“rational”‭. ‬International law and institutional norms‭, ‬while still important‭, ‬may lose effectiveness when they conflict with calculations‭ ‬of power and strategic interests‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬this transformation requires rebuilding defence doctrines on the basis of preparing for worst-case scenarios rather than assuming the stability of the international system‭. ‬Defence planning is therefore shifting from a logic of prediction towards one centred on managing uncertainty and preparing for unexpected escalation within an increasingly volatile strategic environment‭.‬

2‭. ‬Wars as a Mechanism for Reshaping Defence Doctrines‭:‬‭ ‬Contemporary conflicts have also demonstrated that wars do not necessarily dismantle existing defence doctrines‭, ‬but rather reorder their priorities and redirect them according to emerging threats‭. ‬Wars function as revealing moments that force states to reassess previous assumptions and conduct practical reviews of security and defence concepts‭. ‬This shift is particularly evident in NATO’s transformation following the Ukraine war‭, ‬as the alliance returned to the logic of collective defence after a prolonged period‭ ‬focused on external interventions and distant crisis management‭. ‬The transformation reflects a broader transition from an intervention-oriented defence model towards one centred on protecting the immediate strategic sphere and strengthening internal readiness‭. ‬Consequently‭, ‬wars increasingly serve as dynamic mechanisms for redefining security priorities and redirecting defence doctrines in line with an evolving strategic environment characterised by growing and increasingly complex threats‭.‬

3‭. ‬Sustainable Operational Readiness as the Core of Military Effectiveness‭: ‬Contemporary wars have also demonstrated that possessing advanced military capabilities alone does not guarantee operational effectiveness without the ability to activate them rapidly and efficiently‭. ‬Military strength has evolved beyond being measured solely by the size of an arsenal or the sophistication of equipment‭, ‬but by the ability of armed forces to translate capabilities into operational action at the right moment‭. ‬This was particularly evident during the Russia–Ukraine war‭, ‬where Russia‭, ‬despite its quantitative and qualitative military superiority‭, ‬faced difficulties in achieving a swift and decisive outcome during the initial stages of the conflict‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬operational readiness has emerged as a decisive component of modern defence doctrine‭. ‬It depends on the integration of rapid strategic and operational decision-making‭, ‬effective coordination between military units‭, ‬interoperability among forces‭, ‬and the efficiency of intelligence and early warning systems‭. ‬This reflects a broader shift from the logic of‭ ‬“possessing power”‭ ‬to that of‭ ‬“activating power”‭, ‬where superiority is increasingly determined by a state’s ability to respond quickly‭, ‬adapt to battlefield developments‭, ‬and conduct operations with high efficiency‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬military powerstopped being viewed‭  ‬as a static asset‭, ‬but rather as a dynamic capability defined by the readiness of the defence system to respond immediately and effectively within an increasingly complex and fast-moving strategic environment‭.‬

4‭. ‬Contemporary Warfare as a Hybrid‭, ‬Multi-Level Conflict‭: ‬Narrative Warfare and the Battle for Perception‭: ‬Modern conflicts have also revealed a qualitative transformation in the nature of warfare‭. ‬War has shifted away from being confined to direct military confrontation‭, ‬but has evolved into a hybrid‭, ‬multi-domain phenomenon in which conventional and unconventional tools are deeply intertwined‭. ‬Recent conflicts demonstrate that military operations are now integrated with economic and energy pressure‭, ‬intelligence operations‭, ‬media influence‭, ‬and cyberattacks‭. ‬Within this framework‭, ‬attacks do not always take a‭ ‬direct or visible form‭. ‬Instead‭, ‬they are conducted simultaneously across multiple levels aimed at gradually weakening the adversary‭, ‬whether by targeting economic structures‭, ‬disrupting supply chains‭, ‬or shaping public perception‭. ‬This transformation reflects a shift from war as a purely military clash to a comprehensive process of conflict management across interconnected domains‭. ‬Consequently‭, ‬defence doctrines must expand beyond traditional military dimensions to include economic‭, ‬cyber‭, ‬informational‭, ‬and cognitive domains‭, ‬while strengthening multi-level response capabilities and integrating the role of narratives in conflict‭ ‬management‭. ‬One example of this dynamic emerged when Donald Trump declared victory in the confrontation with Iran‭, ‬asserting that much of Iran’s leadership had effectively‭ ‬“disappeared”‭, ‬amounting to regime change‭, ‬and claiming that the country had lost its fleet‭, ‬air force‭, ‬and effective anti-missile and anti-aircraft capabilities‭. ‬However‭, ‬multiple media outlets‭, ‬including American media organisations‭, ‬presented contrasting narratives‭ ‬describing different outcomes‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬defence is no longer limited to protecting borders alone‭. ‬It has become increasingly‭ ‬concerned with safeguarding the state’s comprehensive system across all dimensions within a strategic environment characterised by complexity‭, ‬overlap‭, ‬and rapid change‭.‬

5‭. ‬Military Superiority and the Limits of Effectiveness‭: ‬The Centrality of‭ ‬“Disruptibility”‭: ‬Recent wars demonstrate that possessing advanced defence systems and superior military capabilities does not guarantee complete‭ ‬security‭. ‬Asymmetric threats‭, ‬particularly low-cost drones and missiles‭, ‬have proven capable of causing sustained disruption to‭ ‬critical sectors‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬the concept of‭ ‬“disruptibility”‭ ‬has emerged as a crucial dimension in understanding contemporary security‭. ‬Vital infrastructure‭, ‬including energy‭, ‬water‭, ‬and communications systems‭, ‬has become a primary target in modern conflict‭. ‬This reflects a transition from war as direct military confrontation to a war of attrition aimed at undermining the functional structure of the state itself‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬military superiority alone is no longer sufficient to ensure stability‭. ‬Security has become increasingly linked to a state’s ability to protect critical infrastructure and guarantee the continuity of essential functions‭. ‬Power is therefore redefined not merely by deterrence capabilities‭, ‬but by a state’s ability to reduce its vulnerability to disruption and maintain continuity in the face of asymmetric threats‭. ‬In this regard‭, ‬the United Arab Emirates presented a notable example during the conflict linked to Iran by successfully protecting its critical infrastructure‭, ‬ensuring the continuity of strategic functions‭, ‬and emerging stronger than before the conflict through exceptional cohesion between its leadership‭, ‬armed forces‭, ‬institutions‭, ‬citizens‭, ‬and residents‭.‬

6‭. ‬The Return of the State as a Central Yet Flexible Defence Actor‭: ‬Contemporary wars also reveal the return of the state as the central actor in organising the defence sphere after a period marked by the growing role of non-state actors and increasing reliance on transnational security arrangements‭. ‬However‭, ‬this return does not signify a restoration of the traditional militarised state model‭, ‬but rather the emergence of a flexible defence state redefining its role within a complex and evolving strategic environment‭. ‬This transformation is reflected through enhanced military readiness‭, ‬the rebuilding of defence capabilities‭, ‬the alignment of industrial and economic policies with security objectives‭, ‬and the integration of sustainability and resilience into defence planning‭. ‬It also involves the recentralisation of strategic‭ ‬decision-making while maintaining openness to partnerships and alliances‭. ‬The European experience‭, ‬particularly in France‭, ‬clearly illustrates this shift‭. ‬Recent strategic transformations have prompted a reassessment of the state’s defence role through efforts to strengthen strategic autonomy‭, ‬redirect defence industrial policies‭, ‬and intensify investment‭ ‬in military and technological capabilities‭. ‬This reflects the re-emergence of the state as a central guarantor of national security without abandoning the logic of alliances‭. ‬Ultimately‭, ‬this transformation marks a shift from viewing the state merely as a‭ ‬military actor towards a more integrated model in which security‭, ‬economics‭, ‬and technology are interconnected‭. ‬This enhances the state’s ability to adapt‭, ‬respond‭, ‬and endure in the face of multidimensional threats‭. ‬In the post-war era‭, ‬the state increasingly functions as the central coordinator of a comprehensive defence system rather than simply an operator of military force‭, ‬acting instead as a strategic manager of the interaction between all components of national power‭.‬

7‭. ‬The Economy as a Decisive Variable in Defence Capability‭: ‬Within the contemporary strategic environment‭, ‬the economy is no longer merely a supporting factor for military operations‭, ‬but‭ ‬has become a decisive variable in determining a state’s defence capability and its ability to sustain prolonged conflicts‭. ‬Recent wars have demonstrated that military superiority cannot be maintained without an economic base capable of financing operations‭, ‬compensating for attrition‭, ‬and ensuring continuity‭ ‬of production‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬the centrality of the defence economy is reflected through military-related industrial and production capacity‭, ‬achieving a degree of energy independence to reduce strategic vulnerability‭, ‬the efficient management and allocation‭ ‬of resources towards defence priorities‭, ‬and the protection of vital supply chains‭. ‬This transformation reflects a shift from viewing the economy as a supplementary instrument of war to recognising it as a structural pillar of security and defence‭. ‬A state’s capacity to endure and sustain conflict is therefore increasingly determined by the resilience of its economic structure and its ability to adapt to the pressures of war‭.‬

8‭. ‬Resilience as a Key Measure of Modern Power‭ ‬Power in the contemporary strategic environment is no longer measured exclusively by deterrence capabilities or military superiority‭. ‬Increasingly‭, ‬it is defined by a state’s ability to withstand shocks and disruptions‭. ‬Recent wars have shown that fully preventing attacks is no longer a realistic objective in the face of asymmetric threats‭, ‬leading to a redefinition of power as the capacity to endure under pressure‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬resilience refers to an integrated system of capabilities that includes absorbing initial shocks and minimising their impact‭, ‬ensuring the continuity of critical services and infrastructure‭, ‬and rapidly recovering and rebuilding operational capabilities‭. ‬Resilience extends beyond the military sphere to encompass societal‭, ‬economic‭, ‬and cyber dimensions‭, ‬making social cohesion and institutional efficiency critical elements in preserving stability during crises‭. ‬The growing prominence of resilience reflects a shift from the logic of‭ ‬“preventing threats”‭ ‬to that of‭ ‬“limiting impact”‭. ‬The strongest state has ceased to be simply the one capable of preventing attacks‭, ‬but the one able to endure‭, ‬adapt‭, ‬and continue functioning while minimising the consequences of attacks within a strategic environment characterised by uncertainty and complexity‭. ‬In this regard‭, ‬the Gulf states presented a notable model during the recent conflict linked to Iran‭, ‬demonstrating an‭ ‬ability to maintain stability‭, ‬preserve the continuity of vital functions‭, ‬and emerge stronger than before the conflict‭.‬

9‭. ‬The Return of the Nuclear Dimension in Deterrence Equations‭: ‬Recent wars have also highlighted the return of the nuclear dimension as an active factor in reshaping deterrence equations‭, ‬albeit in a form different from the classical Cold War model‭. ‬What has emerged is a form of‭ ‬“interactive and integrated nuclear deterrence”‭, ‬in which nuclear threats are used not only to protect vital interests or deter attacks‭, ‬but also as strategic tools designed to secure military operations and prevent adversaries from escalating or intervening directly‭. ‬This transformation reflects the reintegration of nuclear weapons into a broader and more complex deterrence framework in which conventional and unconventional escalation levels overlap‭. ‬Nuclear threats have therefore become part of conflict management rather than merely instruments of containment‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬the nuclear dimension can no longer be treated as a separate element within defence doctrine‭. ‬Instead‭, ‬it‭ ‬must be integrated into a comprehensive strategic framework linking conventional and non-conventional capabilities‭. ‬The return‭ ‬of the nuclear factor reflects a transition from static deterrence to dynamic‭, ‬multi-layered deterrence in which nuclear threats‭ ‬are employed not only to prevent war‭, ‬but also to shape its trajectory and limits within an increasingly complex strategic environment‭.‬

10‭. ‬The Collapse of the‭ ‬“Stability Through Economic Interdependence”‭ ‬Theory‭: ‬Recent conflicts have undermined the assumption that economic interdependence inherently guarantees stability and peace‭. ‬The theory long held that deepening economic ties with major powers would naturally moderate their behaviour and reduce the likelihood‭ ‬of conflict‭. ‬However‭, ‬practical experience‭, ‬particularly during the war in Ukraine‭, ‬demonstrated the opposite‭, ‬as economic and technological gains were used to strengthen military capabilities‭, ‬develop hybrid warfare tools‭, ‬and expand strategic influence‭. ‬Against this backdrop‭, ‬economic interdependence is no longer viewed solely as a stabilising factor‭, ‬but increasingly as an instrument of power capable of reshaping the balance of conflict through energy leverage‭, ‬supply chain manipulation‭, ‬and technological dependency‭. ‬This transformation reflects the reintegration of economics into the logic of security‭, ‬requiring a shift away from separating the two domains towards a strategic approach that reconnects economics with security and defence considerations‭.‬

11‭. ‬The Defence Industrial Base as a Structural Condition for Strategic Sustainability‭: ‬Defence capability is no longer measured solely by the size of military arsenals or the sophistication of weapon systems‭. ‬It is‭ ‬increasingly tied to the existence of a defence industrial base capable of sustained production and adaptation to the evolving requirements of conflict‭. ‬Modern wars‭, ‬particularly prolonged ones‭, ‬have demonstrated that initial military superiority can rapidly erode in the absence of sustainable production capabilities able to compensate for attrition and support ongoing operations‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬the defence industrial base has become a structural pillar of modern defence doctrine‭, ‬reflecting a transition‭ ‬from understanding defence as an immediate combat capability to viewing it as a long-term productive capacity‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬defence industries have become decisive factors in determining a state’s ability to endure‭, ‬sustain operations‭, ‬and manage wars of attrition within a strategic environment characterised by continuity‭ ‬and complexity‭.‬

12‭. ‬Strategic Autonomy and Burden-Sharing Within Alliances‭: ‬Contemporary wars have also highlighted that reliance on allies in its traditional form is no longer sufficient‭, ‬necessitating a‭ ‬redefinition of relationships within alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization‭. ‬The model of unbalanced dependence on a central power is increasingly unable to guarantee security within a strategic environment characterised by complexity and multiple sources of threat‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬modern defence doctrine is based on a dual principle combining burden-sharing among alliance members with the preservation of strategic autonomy through maintaining national decision-making margins and independent‭ ‬capabilities‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬participation in alliances no longer implies the erosion of sovereignty‭. ‬Instead‭, ‬alliances can serve as instruments for enhancing defence capabilities‭, ‬provided that a careful balance is maintained between interdependence and self-reliance‭. ‬This transformation reflects a shift from viewing alliances as external protection mechanisms towards a more balanced model based on active strategic partnership‭, ‬where capabilities are integrated without sacrificing autonomy‭.‬

13‭. ‬Comprehensive Security and Multi-Dimensional Deterrence as the Foundations of an Integrated Defence System‭: ‬Contemporary wars in Europe and the Middle East have clearly demonstrated a structural transformation in the concept of security‭. ‬Security has expanded beyond the military sphere alone‭, ‬but has evolved into a comprehensive system in which civilian and military dimensions are deeply interconnected‭. ‬Energy sectors‭, ‬infrastructure‭, ‬and society itself have become integral components of‭ ‬the defence equation‭. ‬This reflects a transition towards an integrated model in which security is redefined as the state’s ability to protect its overall system and ensure continuity under pressure‭. ‬At the same time‭, ‬deterrence is evolving towards a‭ ‬dynamic and multidimensional model that extends beyond military power alone‭. ‬It increasingly relies on the integration of cyber‭, ‬economic‭, ‬and informational instruments aimed at shaping the adversary’s perceptions and influencing behaviour‭. ‬Ultimately‭, ‬comprehensive security and multidimensional deterrence converge within a unified strategic vision in which defence doctrine becomes a complex‭, ‬multi-layered system integrating military power‭, ‬economics‭, ‬society‭, ‬and technology‭. ‬This integration enhances the state’s capacity to deter‭, ‬adapt‭, ‬and endure within an increasingly complex strategic environment‭.‬

Conclusion

This study demonstrates that contemporary wars are no longer merely military events measured by battlefield outcomes‭. ‬They have‭ ‬instead become strategic laboratories reshaping concepts of power‭, ‬security‭, ‬and the limits of defensive action‭. ‬The central lesson therefore lies not only in the evolution of the tools of warfare‭, ‬but in the transformation of the logic of war itself‭: ‬from‭ ‬conflict managed primarily through military force to a complex process driven by the interaction of military‭, ‬economic‭, ‬technological‭, ‬and societal dimensions‭, ‬with perception management and strategic narratives at its core‭. ‬In this context‭, ‬lessons drawn‭ ‬from contemporary wars in Europe and the Middle East reveal that the effectiveness of defence doctrine is no longer measured by‭ ‬the mere possession of capabilities‭, ‬but by the state’s ability to mobilise‭, ‬integrate‭, ‬and operationalise them within a multidimensional system‭. ‬Active defence reduces vulnerability‭ ‬to disruption‭, ‬operational readiness transforms power into action‭, ‬integrated deterrence shapes adversarial perception‭, ‬resilience guarantees continuity‭, ‬and strategic autonomy balances partnership with self-reliance‭. ‬Together‭, ‬these dimensions form a defence architecture capable of addressing conflicts that are no longer linear‭, ‬but hybrid‭, ‬multidimensional‭, ‬and simultaneous across multiple levels‭. ‬Accordingly‭, ‬the true measure of power is no longer simply the ability to prevent war‭, ‬but the ability to manage conflict‭, ‬contain its consequences‭, ‬and sustain national continuity if war occurs‭ ‬—‭ ‬an increasingly plausible possibility within a strategic environment characterised by uncertainty and persistence‭. ‬Likewise‭, ‬the state is no longer a reactive actor waiting for threats to emerge‭, ‬but a proactive actor capable of reshaping its strategic environment through risk management rather than merely responding to threats‭. ‬The transition from‭ ‬“security as protection”‭ ‬to‭ ‬“security as sustainability”‭, ‬from‭ ‬“deterrence as threat”‭ ‬to‭ ‬“deterrence as perception management”‭, ‬and from‭ ‬“power as possession”‭ ‬to‭ ‬“power as operational capability”‭ ‬represents the essence of the shift towards a new defence doctrine‭. ‬This doctrine does not merely seek to avoid war‭, ‬but aims to control its trajectories and limits within a strategic environment defined by uncertainty‭. ‬As a result‭, ‬the future of defence‭ ‬doctrines is moving towards a complex model that positions the state as a geopolitical producer of security rather than merely a‭ ‬consumer of it‭, ‬capable of transforming strategic complexity from a source of threat into a domain of influence‭, ‬adaptation‭, ‬and strategic reshaping‭.‬

By‭: ‬Prof‭. ‬Wael Saleh‭, (‬Director at TRENDS Research‭ & ‬Advisory‭, ‬France and Canada‭)‬

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